Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation

Jason R. Marden, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The theory of learning in games has sought to understand how and why equilibria emerge in non-cooperative games. Traditionally, social science literature develops descriptive game theoretic models for players, analyzes the limiting behavior, and generalizes the results for larger classes of games. Recently, there has been a significant amount of research seeking to understand these behavioral models not from a descriptive point of view, but rather from a prescriptive point of view [1]-[4]. The goal is to use these behavioral models as a prescriptive control approach in distributed multi-agent systems where the guaranteed limiting behavior would represent a desirable operating condition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010
Pages1171-1172
Number of pages2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Sep 29 2010Oct 1 2010

Publication series

Name2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010

Other

Other48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period9/29/1010/1/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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