@inproceedings{56a5f67383c842f1a4bb47bde4db05f4,
title = "Revenue optimal auction for single-minded buyers",
abstract = "We study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers. We identify revenue optimal auctions with a simple structure, if the conditional distribution of any buyer's valuation is nondecreasing, in the hazard rates ordering of probability distributions, as a function of the bundle the buyer is interested in. The revenue optimal auction is given by the solution of a maximum weight independent set problem. We provide a novel graphical construction of the weights and highlight important properties of the resulting auction.",
author = "Vineet Abhishek and Bruce Hajek",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1109/CDC.2010.5717951",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781424477456",
series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "1842--1847",
booktitle = "2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010",
address = "United States",
note = "49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 ; Conference date: 15-12-2010 Through 17-12-2010",
}