Reliable Intersection Control in Non-cooperative Environments∗

Muhammed O. Sayin, Chung Wei Lin, Shinichi Shiraishi, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


We propose a reliable intersection control mechanism for strategic autonomous and connected vehicles (agents) in non-cooperative environments. Each agent has access to his/her earliest possible and desired passing times, and reports a passing time to the intersection manager, who allocates the intersection temporally to the agents in a First-Come-First-Serve basis. However, the agents might have conflicting interests and can take actions strategically. To this end, we analyze the strategic behaviors of the agents and formulate Nash equilibria for all possible scenarios. Furthermore, among all Nash equilibria we identify a socially optimal equilibrium that leads to a fair intersection allocation, and correspondingly we describe a strategy-proof intersection mechanism, which achieves reliable intersection control such that the strategic agents do not have any incentive to misreport their passing times strategically.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781538654286
StatePublished - Aug 9 2018
Event2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 - Milwauke, United States
Duration: Jun 27 2018Jun 29 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
ISSN (Print)0743-1619


Other2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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