Reliable GPS-based timing for power systems: A multi-layered multi-receiver architecture

Liang Heng, Jonathan J Makela, Alejandro Dominguez-Garcia, Rakesh B. Bobba, William H Sanders, Grace Xingxin Gao

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

Synchronized voltage and current phasor measurements provided by phasor measurement units (PMUs) have the potential to augment power system monitoring, control, and protection functions. PMUs use the Global Positioning System (GPS) to synchronize measurements across a wide geographical area. Unfortunately, low-received-power, unencrypted civil GPS signals are vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks. Accidental receiver malfunction can also lead to incorrect position/time solutions. This paper presents a multi-layered multi-receiver architecture that hardens GPS-based timing against jamming, spoofing, and receiver errors. Our architecture integrates eight countermeasures in all layers of receiver signal and data processing; most of the countermeasures exploit the static and networked nature of time reference receivers. We define five threat models, and qualitatively analyze the effectiveness of each countermeasure against each threat model. The analysis demonstrates that the redundant, independent but complementary countermeasures provide high reliability and robustness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Event2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014 - Champaign, IL, United States
Duration: Feb 28 2014Mar 1 2014

Other

Other2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014
CountryUnited States
CityChampaign, IL
Period2/28/143/1/14

Fingerprint

Phasor measurement units
Global positioning system
Jamming
Electric power system measurement
Electric current measurement
Signal processing
Electric potential

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Fuel Technology

Cite this

Heng, L., Makela, J. J., Dominguez-Garcia, A., Bobba, R. B., Sanders, W. H., & Gao, G. X. (2014). Reliable GPS-based timing for power systems: A multi-layered multi-receiver architecture. Paper presented at 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014, Champaign, IL, United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/PECI.2014.6804565

Reliable GPS-based timing for power systems : A multi-layered multi-receiver architecture. / Heng, Liang; Makela, Jonathan J; Dominguez-Garcia, Alejandro; Bobba, Rakesh B.; Sanders, William H; Gao, Grace Xingxin.

2014. Paper presented at 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014, Champaign, IL, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Heng, L, Makela, JJ, Dominguez-Garcia, A, Bobba, RB, Sanders, WH & Gao, GX 2014, 'Reliable GPS-based timing for power systems: A multi-layered multi-receiver architecture' Paper presented at 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014, Champaign, IL, United States, 2/28/14 - 3/1/14, . https://doi.org/10.1109/PECI.2014.6804565
Heng L, Makela JJ, Dominguez-Garcia A, Bobba RB, Sanders WH, Gao GX. Reliable GPS-based timing for power systems: A multi-layered multi-receiver architecture. 2014. Paper presented at 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014, Champaign, IL, United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/PECI.2014.6804565
Heng, Liang ; Makela, Jonathan J ; Dominguez-Garcia, Alejandro ; Bobba, Rakesh B. ; Sanders, William H ; Gao, Grace Xingxin. / Reliable GPS-based timing for power systems : A multi-layered multi-receiver architecture. Paper presented at 2014 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2014, Champaign, IL, United States.
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