Reelection and Renegotiation: International Agreements in the Shadow of the Polls

Peter Buisseret, Dan Bernhardt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study dynamic international agreements when one of the negotiating parties faces a threat of electoral replacement during negotiations, when agreements made before the election are the starting point for any subsequent renegotiation, and when governments cannot commit to future negotiation strategies. Conflicts of interest between governments may be softened or intensified by the governments' conflicts of interest with voters. We characterize when the threat of electoral turnover strengthens the prospect for successful negotiations, when it may cause negotiations to fail, and how it affects the division of the surplus from cooperation. We also show how changes in domestic politics-including uncertainty about the preferences of domestic political parties-affect a domestic government's ability to extract greater concessions in negotiations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)792-808
Number of pages17
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 1 2018
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations


Dive into the research topics of 'Reelection and Renegotiation: International Agreements in the Shadow of the Polls'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this