Abstract
Group communication systems that provide consistent group membership and reliable, ordered multicast properties in the presence of faults resulting from malicious intrusions have not been analyzed extensively to quantify the cost of tolerating these intrusions. This paper attempts to quantify this cost by presenting results from an experimental evaluation of three new intrusion-tolerant microprotocols that have been added to an existing crash-fault-tolerant group communication system. The results are analyzed to identify the parts that contribute the most overhead during provision of intrusion tolerance at the group communication system level.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks |
Pages | 229-238 |
Number of pages | 10 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2002 |
Event | Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks DNS 2002 - Washington, DC, United States Duration: Jun 23 2002 → Jun 26 2002 |
Other
Other | Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks DNS 2002 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Washington, DC |
Period | 6/23/02 → 6/26/02 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Engineering(all)