Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation

Kunpeng Li; Dilip Chhajed; Suman Mallik

doi:10.1109/SOLI.2010.5551626

Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation

Kunpeng Li, Dilip Chhajed, Suman Mallik

Business Administration

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

When product quality is unobservable to consumers, a manufacturer can convey quality information using signals such as warranty and brand reputation. The purpose of this paper is to study the interaction between warranty, brand reputation, and product quality, and to examine alternative quality-signaling strategies. We model a monopolist who conveys unobservable product quality through signals of warranty and brand reputation. Heterogeneous consumers perceive the signals, form quality beliefs, and make purchase decisions. Consumers also update brand reputation perceptions after product consumptions. Under this framework, we study the monopolist's optimal decisions of price, warranty, and quality in a one-period model.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010
Pages	7-10
Number of pages	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SOLI.2010.5551626
State	Published - 2010
Event	2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010 - QingDao, China Duration: Jul 15 2010 → Jul 17 2010

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010

Other

Other	2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010
Country/Territory	China
City	QingDao
Period	7/15/10 → 7/17/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Information Systems and Management
Management Science and Operations Research

Online availability

10.1109/SOLI.2010.5551626

Library availability

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Li, K., Chhajed, D., & Mallik, S. (2010). Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation. In Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010 (pp. 7-10). Article 5551626 (Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010). https://doi.org/10.1109/SOLI.2010.5551626

Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation. / Li, Kunpeng; Chhajed, Dilip; Mallik, Suman.
Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010. 2010. p. 7-10 5551626 (Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Li, K, Chhajed, D & Mallik, S 2010, Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation. in Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010., 5551626, Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010, pp. 7-10, 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010, QingDao, China, 7/15/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/SOLI.2010.5551626

Li K, Chhajed D, Mallik S. Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation. In Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010. 2010. p. 7-10. 5551626. (Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, SOLI 2010). doi: 10.1109/SOLI.2010.5551626

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Quality signaling through warranty & brand reputation

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