Quality of information aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing systems

Haiming Jin, Lu Su, Danyang Chen, Klara Nahrstedt, Jinhui Xu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems, which leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices for large scale sensing tasks. In this paper, we study a critical problem in MCS systems, namely, incentivizing user participation. Different from existing work, we incorporate a crucial metric, called users' quality of information (QoI), into our incentive mechanisms for MCS systems. Due to various factors (e.g., sensor quality, noise, etc.) the quality of the sensory data contributed by individual users varies significantly. Obtaining high quality data with little expense is always the ideal of MCS platforms. Technically, we design incentive mechanisms based on reverse combinatorial auctions. We investigate both the singleminded and multi-minded combinatorial auction models. For the former, we design a truthful, individual rational and computationally efficient mechanism that approximately maximizes the social welfare with a guaranteed approximation ratio. For the latter, we design an iterative descending mechanism that achieves close-tooptimal social welfare while satisfying individual rationality and computational efficiency. Through extensive simulations, we validate our theoretical analysis about the close-to-optimal social welfare and fast running time of our mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationMSCC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop for Mobile Sensing, Computing and Communication, co-located with MobiHoc 2015
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages167-176
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781450334891, 9781450335140, 9781450335171, 9781450335188, 9781450335232, 9781450335249, 9781450335256
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 22 2015
Event16th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2015 - Hangzhou, China
Duration: Jun 22 2015Jun 25 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)
Volume2015-June

Other

Other16th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2015
CountryChina
CityHangzhou
Period6/22/156/25/15

Keywords

  • Crowd Sensing
  • Incentive Mechanism
  • Quality of Information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

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