Public Signals and Persuasion for Road Network Congestion Games under Vagaries

Olivier Massicot, Cedric Langbort

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In the context of road network congestion, public provision of information is a way to convince drivers to act more socially by shifting their Wardrop equilibrium. In this paper we establish a framework to pose the problem in a road traffic approach and characterize the disclosure mechanism. The games considered are single-commodity road networks subject to independent vagaries. An omniscient controller partially discloses his information to a population of non-cooperative drivers, in a message at the entrance of the network. For the two-route network with single vagary case, we provide a complete characterization of the optimal public signaling policy and, in particular, identify situations where neither full nor no-disclosure is optimal. We also show how to extend the framework of Bayesian persuasion to the context of road networks under multitple independent vagaries.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)124-130
Number of pages7
Issue number34
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019


  • Advanced control design-linear
  • Intelligent road transportation
  • Urban mobility
  • large scale control systems
  • non-linear
  • stochastic

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering


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