TY - JOUR
T1 - Protecting the winner. Second-price versus oral auctions
AU - Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
AU - Kahn, Charles M.
PY - 1991/3
Y1 - 1991/3
N2 - In oral auctions, unlike sealed-bid second-price auctions, the winner never reveals his reservation price. We investigate bidders' strategies in the two auctions when third-parties can exploit information revealed by the auction. When exploitation is likely, oral auctions are more efficient than sealed-bid second-price auctions, and preferred by all participants.
AB - In oral auctions, unlike sealed-bid second-price auctions, the winner never reveals his reservation price. We investigate bidders' strategies in the two auctions when third-parties can exploit information revealed by the auction. When exploitation is likely, oral auctions are more efficient than sealed-bid second-price auctions, and preferred by all participants.
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U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90137-A
DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90137-A
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0009096770
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 35
SP - 243
EP - 248
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
IS - 3
ER -