Protecting the winner. Second-price versus oral auctions

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Charles M. Kahn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In oral auctions, unlike sealed-bid second-price auctions, the winner never reveals his reservation price. We investigate bidders' strategies in the two auctions when third-parties can exploit information revealed by the auction. When exploitation is likely, oral auctions are more efficient than sealed-bid second-price auctions, and preferred by all participants.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)243-248
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume35
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1991

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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