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Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms)
Dan Bernhardt
, Christopher P. Chambers
Economics
Gies College of Business
Finance
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Keyphrases
Wages
100%
Firm Profits
100%
Market Conditions
100%
Cartels
100%
Profit Sharing
100%
Expected Profit
50%
Cheating
50%
Demand Uncertainty
50%
Expected Price
50%
Partial Sharing
50%
Wage Differentials
50%
Dynamic Oligopoly Model
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Profit Sharing
100%
Price
100%
Oligopoly
50%
Wage Structure
50%