Abstract
Glenberg's theory is rich and provocative, in our view, but we find fault with the premise that all memory representations are embodied. We cite instances in which that premise mispredicts empirical results or underestimates human capabilities, and we suggest that the motivation for the embodiment idea - to avoid the symbol-grounding problem - should not, ultimately, constrain psychological theorizing.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 20 |
| Number of pages | 1 |
| Journal | Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1997 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
- Physiology
- Behavioral Neuroscience