@article{71ab47203aed4280944adcd5723c7885,
title = "Private polling in elections and voter welfare",
abstract = "We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals, and thus private over public polling. Some noise in the polling technology raises voters' welfare.",
keywords = "Elections, Platform divergence, Political campaigns, Polling, Spending caps",
author = "Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan and Francesco Squintani",
note = "Funding Information: ✩ We thank Mark Fey, Li Hao, Christian Hellwig, Hugo Hopenhayn, Steve Landsburg, Claire Leaver, Jean-Francois Mertens, Becky Morton, Roger Myerson, Tom Palfrey, Ronny Razin, Larry Rothenberg, Guido Tabellini, and Paul Whiteley for their enlightening comments. We appreciate the suggestions and comments of participants at the CETC meeting 2002, the Society of Economic Design meeting 2002, the Social Choice and Welfare meeting 2002, the Wallis Institute Summer Conference 2002, the MPSA meeting 2003, and in seminars at Caltech, New York University, University College London, University of California at Los Angeles, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, Washington University at St. Louis, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Dan Bernhardt gratefully acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation, grant SES-0317700. John Duggan gratefully acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation, grant SES-0213738. We take responsibility for all errors or omissions. * Corresponding author.",
year = "2009",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "144",
pages = "2021--2056",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "5",
}