Private ordering of shareholder litigation in the EU and the US

Matteo Gargantini, Verity Winship

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter takes a comparative approach to private ordering of shareholder litigation. To what extent can the players in shareholder litigation—companies, management, shareholders, and other investors—set the rules for litigation through private agreement? The chapter begins with the US example, in which dispute resolution provisions emerged in the constituent documents of US companies as a response to pressures from litigation. The contours of permissible provisions have not been exhaustively drawn, but dispute resolution bylaws have been tested in US state courts and were the subject of subnational legislation. The chapter then examines how private ordering of shareholder litigation—both intracorporate and securities suits—might function (or not) in the context of the EU and some of its constituent countries. This comparison highlights many of the similarities, as well as important differences, in how the United States and the EU approach private ordering in shareholder litigation.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationResearch Handbook on Representative Shareholder Litigation
EditorsSean Griffith, Jessica Erickson, David H Webber, Verity Winship
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing
Pages439-458
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)9781786435347
ISBN (Print)9781786435330
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 30 2018

Publication series

NameResearch Handbooks in Corporate Law and Governance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

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