Pricing under Information Asymmetry for a Large Population of Users

Hongxia Shen, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we study optimal nonlinear pricing policy design for a monopolistic network service provider in the face of a large population of users. We assume that users have stochastic types. In [1], games with information symmetry have been considered; that is, users’ true types may be public information available to all parties, or each user’s true type may be private information known only to that user. In this paper, we study the intermediate case with information asymmetry; that is, users’ true types are shared information among users, but are not disclosed to the service provider. The problem can be formulated as an incentive-design problem, and an ε-team optimal incentive (pricing) policy is obtained, which almost achieves Pareto optimality for the service provider. A comparative study between games with information symmetry and asymmetry are conducted as well to evaluate the service provider’s game preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGAMECOMM 2007 - 1st International ICST Workshop on Game Theory for Communication Networks
EditorsRachid ElAzouzi
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
ISBN (Electronic)9789639799004
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
Event1st International ICST Workshop on Game Theory for Communication Networks, GAMECOMM 2007 - Nantes, France
Duration: Oct 22 2007 → …

Publication series

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Conference

Conference1st International ICST Workshop on Game Theory for Communication Networks, GAMECOMM 2007
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityNantes
Period10/22/07 → …

Keywords

  • Active pricing
  • Incentives
  • Incomplete information
  • Information asymmetry
  • Nonlinear pricing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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