Abstract
We believe in the existence of an objective, mind-independent world — much of which is the way it is regardless of human interests, goals, cognitive/perceptual capacities, and research agendas. There would have been fossils, neutrinos, and curvatures in space-time even if no one had been around to theorize about them; Kepler’s laws would have accurately modeled planetary motion even if no one had realized it. To this extent we are ‘realists’. But we also believe that our concepts of objectivity, mind-independence, and cognate notions are shot through with interests, goals, and similarity standards grounded in provincial facts about ourselves. To this extent we are ‘pragmatists’. Such a package, if not examined too closely, appears incoherent: varieties of pragmatism are often claimed to undermine the very objectivity insisted upon by self-avowed realists. But this appearance is illusory.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods |
Editors | Chris Daly |
Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
Pages | 331-360 |
Number of pages | 30 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781137344557 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781349576999 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 31 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Linguistic Form
- Ontological Claim
- Linguistic Community
- Linguistic Meaning
- Planck Length
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities