Abstract
A price-setting seller faces a buyer with unknown reservation value. We show that if the buyer is sufficiently risk averse, the seller can benefit from employing a Possibly-Final Offer (PFO) strategy. In a PFO, if the buyer rejects the seller's initial offer the seller sometimes terminates the interaction. If the seller does not terminate, he follows up with a subsequent, more attractive offer. As the buyer's risk aversion increases, the seller's expected profit under the optimal PFO approaches the full-information profit. These results extend to contexts with endogenous commitment, multiple types of buyers, multidimensional objects, and nonseparable utility functions.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 789-819 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2006 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation