Political Conflict over Time

William Howell, Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We study a model of electoral competition in which politicians must decide whether to initiate the provision of some public good and, afterward, how much of the public good to supply. The model illuminates how a project's implementation affects elections and, conversely, how electoral considerations influence decisions about implementation. Under well-defined conditions, politicians will either implement projects that they do not like or delay projects that, absent electoral concerns, they would support. The model further reveals how the perceived benefits of holding office can impede the production of public goods about which there is broad consensus. And depending on facts about the program's structure and the electoral landscape, a policy's implementation can either mitigate or exacerbate political conflict.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

Fingerprint

political conflict
politician
policy implementation
election
time

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Political Conflict over Time. / Howell, William; Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias.

In: American Journal of Political Science, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{adb2917c7cf74191bd0489e06d4a9fa7,
title = "Political Conflict over Time",
abstract = "We study a model of electoral competition in which politicians must decide whether to initiate the provision of some public good and, afterward, how much of the public good to supply. The model illuminates how a project's implementation affects elections and, conversely, how electoral considerations influence decisions about implementation. Under well-defined conditions, politicians will either implement projects that they do not like or delay projects that, absent electoral concerns, they would support. The model further reveals how the perceived benefits of holding office can impede the production of public goods about which there is broad consensus. And depending on facts about the program's structure and the electoral landscape, a policy's implementation can either mitigate or exacerbate political conflict.",
author = "William Howell and Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn",
year = "2019",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/ajps.12467",
language = "English (US)",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0092-5853",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Political Conflict over Time

AU - Howell, William

AU - Krasa, Stefan

AU - Polborn, Mattias

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - We study a model of electoral competition in which politicians must decide whether to initiate the provision of some public good and, afterward, how much of the public good to supply. The model illuminates how a project's implementation affects elections and, conversely, how electoral considerations influence decisions about implementation. Under well-defined conditions, politicians will either implement projects that they do not like or delay projects that, absent electoral concerns, they would support. The model further reveals how the perceived benefits of holding office can impede the production of public goods about which there is broad consensus. And depending on facts about the program's structure and the electoral landscape, a policy's implementation can either mitigate or exacerbate political conflict.

AB - We study a model of electoral competition in which politicians must decide whether to initiate the provision of some public good and, afterward, how much of the public good to supply. The model illuminates how a project's implementation affects elections and, conversely, how electoral considerations influence decisions about implementation. Under well-defined conditions, politicians will either implement projects that they do not like or delay projects that, absent electoral concerns, they would support. The model further reveals how the perceived benefits of holding office can impede the production of public goods about which there is broad consensus. And depending on facts about the program's structure and the electoral landscape, a policy's implementation can either mitigate or exacerbate political conflict.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074034462&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85074034462&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12467

DO - 10.1111/ajps.12467

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85074034462

JO - American Journal of Political Science

JF - American Journal of Political Science

SN - 0092-5853

ER -