Abstract
We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 809-825 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | American Political Science Review |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 1 2018 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
Political Competition in Legislative Elections. / Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K.
In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 112, No. 4, 01.11.2018, p. 809-825.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Political Competition in Legislative Elections
AU - Krasa, Stefan
AU - Polborn, Mattias K.
PY - 2018/11/1
Y1 - 2018/11/1
N2 - We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering.
AB - We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85052661375&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85052661375&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0003055418000503
DO - 10.1017/S0003055418000503
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85052661375
VL - 112
SP - 809
EP - 825
JO - American Political Science Review
JF - American Political Science Review
SN - 0003-0554
IS - 4
ER -