Political Competition in Legislative Elections

Stefan Krasa, Mattias K. Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)809-825
Number of pages17
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations


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