Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)342-370
Number of pages29
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume94
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this