Abstract
In this study, I consider a company’s optimal use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in principal/ agent relations to filter out common risk. I construct a risk-parity aggregate of the company’s peer group to be the sum of the ratios of the common-and idiosyncratic-risk components of the group of peers’ outputs, scaled by the variance of the common risk. I demonstrate that this aggregate embodies the peer group’s informativeness about the common risk, so it captures precisely the group’s innate capability to trade off optimally between the common-and idiosyncratic-risk components of those peers’ outputs. The optimal use of RPE therefore entails a partial substitution of the common risk with the peers’ idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, the risk-parity aggregate enables us to identify a boundary condition, which helps us rule out ineffective uses of RPE that completely eliminate the common risk, thereby improving the statistical power of a strong-form RPE test.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 247-259 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Management Accounting Research |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 1 2019 |
Keywords
- Common versus idiosyncratic risk trade-off
- Executive pay
- Relative performance evaluation
- Risk-parity aggregate of signals
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Accounting