Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversed Linear-Quadratic Stackelberg games

T. Vallée, Ch Deissenberg, T. Başar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The distinctive characteristic of a "Reversed Stackelberg Game" is that the leader plays twice, first by announcing his future action, second by implementing a possibly different action given the follower's reaction to his announcement. In such a game, if the leader uses the normal Stackelberg solution to find (and announce) his optimal strategy, there is a strong temptation for him to cheat, that is, to implement another action than the one announced. In this paper, within the framework of a standard discrete time Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Reversed Stackelberg game, we discuss and derive the best possible open-loop cheating strategy for an unscrupulous leader.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)217-232
Number of pages16
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
StatePublished - 1999


  • Cheating strategy
  • Reversed Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Management Science and Operations Research


Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversed Linear-Quadratic Stackelberg games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this