Optimal control in the presence of an intelligent jammer with limited actions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a dynamic zero-sum game between two players. The first player acts as a controller for a discrete time LTI plant, while the second player acts to jam the communication between the controller and the plant. The number of jamming actions is limited. We determine saddlepoint equilibrium control and jamming strategies for this game under the full state, total recall information structure for both players, and show that the jammer acts according to a threshold policy at each decision step. Various properties of the threshold functions are derived and complemented by numerical simulation studies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1096-1101
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781424477456
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 - Atlanta, United States
Duration: Dec 15 2010Dec 17 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370

Conference

Conference49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAtlanta
Period12/15/1012/17/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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