Optimal agenda-setter timing

Mattias K. Polborn, Gerald Willmann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1527-1546
Number of pages20
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Volume42
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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