Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

Dario Bauso, Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a 'small world', the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of opinions on allocations via stochastic stability theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number7039707
Pages (from-to)2094-2099
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2015-February
Issue numberFebruary
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Event2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: Dec 15 2014Dec 17 2014

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Coalitional Games
Opinion Dynamics
Small World
Game
Coalitions
Reward
Mean Field
Random processes
Stochastic Stability
Stability Theory
Stability and Convergence
Characteristic Function
Interaction
Continuous Time
Stochastic Processes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities. / Bauso, Dario; Basar, Tamer.

In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Vol. 2015-February, No. February, 7039707, 01.01.2014, p. 2094-2099.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

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