Abstract
This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a 'small world', the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of opinions on allocations via stochastic stability theory.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Article number | 7039707 |
| Pages (from-to) | 2094-2099 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control |
| Volume | 2015-February |
| Issue number | February |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2014 |
| Event | 2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States Duration: Dec 15 2014 → Dec 17 2014 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Modeling and Simulation
- Control and Optimization
Cite this
Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities. / Bauso, Dario; Basar, Tamer.
In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Vol. 2015-February, No. February, 7039707, 01.01.2014, p. 2094-2099.Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities
AU - Bauso, Dario
AU - Basar, Tamer
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a 'small world', the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of opinions on allocations via stochastic stability theory.
AB - This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a 'small world', the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of opinions on allocations via stochastic stability theory.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84988264969&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84988264969&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707
M3 - Conference article
AN - SCOPUS:84988264969
VL - 2015-February
SP - 2094
EP - 2099
JO - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
JF - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SN - 0191-2216
IS - February
M1 - 7039707
ER -