Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

Dario Bauso; Tamer Basar

doi:10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article

Abstract

This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a 'small world', the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of opinions on allocations via stochastic stability theory.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	7039707
Pages (from-to)	2094-2099
Number of pages	6
Journal	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume	2015-February
Issue number	February
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707
State	Published - Jan 1 2014
Event	2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States Duration: Dec 15 2014 → Dec 17 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Control and Systems Engineering
Modeling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

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10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

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Bauso, D., & Basar, T. (2014). Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2015-February(February), 2094-2099. [7039707]. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

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