Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

Dario Bauso; Tamer Basar

doi:10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a 'small world', the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of opinions on allocations via stochastic stability theory.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2014
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	2094-2099
Number of pages	6
Edition	February
ISBN (Electronic)	9781479977468
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707
State	Published - 2014
Event	2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States Duration: Dec 15 2014 → Dec 17 2014

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Number	February
Volume	2015-February
ISSN (Print)	0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)	2576-2370

Other

Other	2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014
Country/Territory	United States
City	Los Angeles
Period	12/15/14 → 12/17/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Control and Systems Engineering
Modeling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

Online availability

10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

Library availability

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Bauso, D., & Basar, T. (2014). Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities. In 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2014 (February ed., pp. 2094-2099). Article 7039707 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 2015-February, No. February). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities. / Bauso, Dario; Basar, Tamer.
53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2014. February. ed. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. p. 2094-2099 7039707 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 2015-February, No. February).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Bauso, D & Basar, T 2014, Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities. in 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2014. February edn, 7039707, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, no. February, vol. 2015-February, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2094-2099, 2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014, Los Angeles, United States, 12/15/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2014.7039707

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Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

Abstract

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