TY - JOUR
T1 - Online revenue maximization for server pricing
AU - Boodaghians, Shant
AU - Fusco, Federico
AU - Leonardi, Stefano
AU - Mansour, Yishay
AU - Mehta, Ruta
N1 - Funding Information:
Shant Boodaghians and Ruta Mehta were partially supported by NSF grant CCF-1750436. Federico Fusco and Stefano Leonardi were supported by ERC Advanced Grant 788893 AMDROMA “Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets” and MIUR PRIN project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets”. Yishay Mansour was supported in part by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation (ISF).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s).
PY - 2022/4
Y1 - 2022/4
N2 - Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers revenue maximization in the online stochastic setting with non-preemptive jobs and a unit capacity server. One agent/job arrives at every time step, with parameters drawn from the underlying distribution. We design a posted-price mechanism which can be efficiently computed and is revenue-optimal in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent’s type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic, depending only on the length of the allotted time interval and on the earliest time the server is available. We also prove that the proposed pricing strategy is robust to imprecise knowledge of the job distribution and that a distribution learned from polynomially many samples is sufficient to obtain a near-optimal truthful pricing strategy.
AB - Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers revenue maximization in the online stochastic setting with non-preemptive jobs and a unit capacity server. One agent/job arrives at every time step, with parameters drawn from the underlying distribution. We design a posted-price mechanism which can be efficiently computed and is revenue-optimal in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent’s type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic, depending only on the length of the allotted time interval and on the earliest time the server is available. We also prove that the proposed pricing strategy is robust to imprecise knowledge of the job distribution and that a distribution learned from polynomially many samples is sufficient to obtain a near-optimal truthful pricing strategy.
KW - Markov Decision Process
KW - Pricing
KW - Server pricing
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U2 - 10.1007/s10458-022-09544-y
DO - 10.1007/s10458-022-09544-y
M3 - Article
C2 - 35125936
AN - SCOPUS:85123457557
SN - 1387-2532
VL - 36
JO - Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
JF - Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
IS - 1
M1 - 11
ER -