On the value of a well chosen bit to the seller in an auction

Bruce Hajek

doi:10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523341

On the value of a well chosen bit to the seller in an auction

Bruce Hajek

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

A central fact in the theory of optimal auction design is that the seller of a single object in an auction with n bidders, having independent, random valuations, typically cannot extract the full maximum value of the object from the buyers. We show that if the seller has access to a single bit of information, even if noisy, then the seller can extract full value. The work is meant to explore the use of information measures in mechanism design problems.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 05
Pages	293-296
Number of pages	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523341
State	Published - 2005
Event	2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 05 - Adelaide, Australia Duration: Sep 4 2005 → Sep 9 2005

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
Volume	2005
ISSN (Print)	2157-8099

Other

Other	2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 05
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Adelaide
Period	9/4/05 → 9/9/05

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
Information Systems
Modeling and Simulation
Applied Mathematics

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10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523341

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Hajek, B 2005, On the value of a well chosen bit to the seller in an auction. in Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 05., 1523341, IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings, vol. 2005, pp. 293-296, 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 05, Adelaide, Australia, 9/4/05. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523341

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On the value of a well chosen bit to the seller in an auction

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