On the role of side information in strategic communication

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


This paper analyzes the fundamental limits of strategic communication in network settings. Strategic communication differs from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since it involves different objectives for the encoder and the decoder, which are aware of this mismatch and act accordingly. This leads to a Stackelberg game where both agents commit to their mappings ex-ante. Building on our prior work on the point-to-point setting, this paper studies the compression and communication problems with the receiver and/or the transmitter side information setting. The equilibrium strategies and the associated costs are characterized for the Gaussian variables and quadratic cost functions. Several questions on the benefit of side information in source and joint source-channel coding in such strategic settings are analyzed. Our analysis has uncovered an interesting result on optimality of uncoded communication in strategic source-channel coding in the presence of receiver side information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - ISIT 2016; 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781509018062
StatePublished - Aug 10 2016
Event2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016 - Barcelona, Spain
Duration: Jul 10 2016Jul 15 2016

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
ISSN (Print)2157-8095


Other2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Applied Mathematics


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