On the dominance of capitalists leadership in a 'Feedback-Stackelberg' solution of a differential game model of capitalism

Tamer Başar, Alain Haurie, Gianni Ricci

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper deals with a modified version of the Lancaster model of capitalism, where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players (workers versus capitalists) and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers. It is shown that a Feedback- Stackelberg solution, with the capitalists acting as leaders and announcing their investment policy at the beginning of each period, is a solution dominating the Feedback-Nash solution. The paper is also intended to be a tutorial on the Feedback-Stackelberg solution, a concept not so often used by economic modelers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)101-125
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'On the dominance of capitalists leadership in a 'Feedback-Stackelberg' solution of a differential game model of capitalism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this