TY - JOUR
T1 - On the dominance of capitalists leadership in a 'Feedback-Stackelberg' solution of a differential game model of capitalism
AU - Başar, Tamer
AU - Haurie, Alain
AU - Ricci, Gianni
N1 - Funding Information:
*Research of Tamer Bagar was supported in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program under contract No. NOOO14-84-C-0149. This research was realized in part while the second author was a visiting professor at the Department of Economics of the University of Modena, Italy. Research was also supported in part by SSHRC-Grant #A4952 and FCAC-Grant #EQ-0428 to the second author.
PY - 1985/9
Y1 - 1985/9
N2 - This paper deals with a modified version of the Lancaster model of capitalism, where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players (workers versus capitalists) and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers. It is shown that a Feedback- Stackelberg solution, with the capitalists acting as leaders and announcing their investment policy at the beginning of each period, is a solution dominating the Feedback-Nash solution. The paper is also intended to be a tutorial on the Feedback-Stackelberg solution, a concept not so often used by economic modelers.
AB - This paper deals with a modified version of the Lancaster model of capitalism, where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players (workers versus capitalists) and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers. It is shown that a Feedback- Stackelberg solution, with the capitalists acting as leaders and announcing their investment policy at the beginning of each period, is a solution dominating the Feedback-Nash solution. The paper is also intended to be a tutorial on the Feedback-Stackelberg solution, a concept not so often used by economic modelers.
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U2 - 10.1016/0165-1889(85)90026-0
DO - 10.1016/0165-1889(85)90026-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0000746919
VL - 9
SP - 101
EP - 125
JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
SN - 0165-1889
IS - 1
ER -