On the design of wholesale electricity markets under uncertainty

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We propose a market mechanism for an electricity market under uncertainty, comprising of dispatchable generators, renewable power producers, and load-serving entities. The single-settlement market mechanism consists of a stochastic economic dispatch and a contingent nodal pricing scheme. We show that the market mechanism is efficient, revenue adequate in all scenarios of available renewable supply, and supports a Radner equilibrium. The proposed design is illustrated through the analysis of a copperplate power system. Finally, it is compared against existing market designs in the literature.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages203-210
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781509018239
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 4 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015 - Monticello, United States
Duration: Sep 29 2015Oct 2 2015

Publication series

Name2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015

Other

Other53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2015
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello
Period9/29/1510/2/15

Keywords

  • Electricity markets
  • Renewable integration
  • Stochastic economic dispatch

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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