On the core of cooperative queueing games

Ulaş Özen, Martin I. Reiman, Qiong Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a class of cooperative games for managing several canonical queueing systems. When cooperating parties invest optimally in common capacity or choose the optimal amount of demand to serve, cooperation leads to "single-attribute" games whose characteristic function is embedded in a one-dimensional function. We show that when and only when the latter function is elastic will all embedded games have a non-empty core, and the core contains a population monotonic allocation. We present sufficient conditions for this property to be satisfied. Our analysis reveals that in most Erlang B and Erlang C queueing systems, the games under our consideration have a non-empty core, but there are exceptions, which we illustrate through a counterexample.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)385-389
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number5
StatePublished - Sep 2011
Externally publishedYes


  • Cooperative games
  • Core
  • Population monotonic allocation schemes
  • Queueing models

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


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