@inproceedings{46819e9b3caa4da2823b1871cecdc92d,
title = "On the comparative performance of information provision policies in network routing games",
abstract = "We study information design for network routing games in the presence of vagaries. We prove strong competitive bounds for various information provision policies, in the spirit of Roughgarden's Price of Anarchy (PoA). In contrast with the classical framework, we show that the PoA may cease to be bounded in the presence of vagaries, unless information is provided to the decision-makers. We also investigate randomized public signaling policies and personalized recommendation, beyond no-and full-information revelation.",
keywords = "information design, network games",
author = "Olivier Massicot and Cedric Langbort",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 IEEE.; 52nd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2018 ; Conference date: 28-10-2018 Through 31-10-2018",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1109/ACSSC.2018.8645342",
language = "English (US)",
series = "Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",
pages = "1434--1438",
editor = "Matthews, {Michael B.}",
booktitle = "Conference Record of the 52nd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2018",
}