On stochastic incentive control problems with partial dynamic information

Derya H. Cansever, Tamer Başar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we consider a stochastic incentive decision problem with N > 1 followers and decentralized static information, where the leader's dynamic information comprises only a linear combination of the followers' actions. We obtain an incentive policy, affine in this dynamic information, which yields the same overall performance as the one the leader would obtain if he had observed the followers' actions separately. The existence conditions involved have been obtained explicitly for the case of finite probability spaces, and some challenging issues have been identified when the random variables are infinite valued. The results presented here have no counterparts in deterministic incentive problems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-75
Number of pages7
JournalSystems and Control Letters
Volume6
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1985

Keywords

  • Incentive control
  • Partial information
  • Stackelberg games
  • Stochastic information patterns

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Computer Science(all)
  • Mechanical Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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