On communication over gaussian sensor networks with adversaries: Further results

Emrah Akyol, Kenneth Rose, Tamer Basa̧r

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


This paper presents new results on the game theoretical analysis of optimal communications strategies over a sensor network model. Our model involves one single Gaussian source observed by many sensors, subject to additive independent Gaussian observation noise. Sensors communicate with the receiver over an additive Gaussian multiple access channel. The aim of the receiver is to reconstruct the underlying source with minimum mean squared error. The scenario of interest here is one where some of the sensors act as adversary (jammer): they aim to maximize distortion. While our recent prior work solved the case where either all or none of the sensors coordinate (use randomized strategies), the focus of this work is the setting where only a subset of the transmitter and/or jammer sensors can coordinate. We show that the solution crucially depends on the ratio of the number of transmitter sensors that can coordinate to the ones that cannot. If this ratio is larger than a fixed threshold determined by the network settings (transmit and jamming power, channel noise and sensor observation noise), then the problem is a zero-sum game and admits a saddle point solution where transmitters with coordination capabilities use randomized linear encoding while the rest of the transmitter sensors is not used at all. Adversarial sensors that can coordinate generate identical Gaussian noise while other adversaries generate independent Gaussian noise. Otherwise (if that ratio is smaller than the threshold), the problem becomes a Stackelberg game where the leader (all transmitter sensors) uses fixed (non-randomized) linear encoding while the follower (all adversarial sensors) uses fixed linear encoding with the opposite sign.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Proceedings
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)9783319027852
StatePublished - 2013
Event4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013 - Fort Worth, TX, United States
Duration: Nov 11 2013Nov 12 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume8252 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityFort Worth, TX


  • Coordination
  • Game theory
  • Sensor networks
  • Source-channel coding

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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