Objectives and constraints of government policy: The countercyclicity of transfers to agriculture

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Estimates of government transfers to typical U.S. com, wheat, and cotton farms are regressed on estimates of market-derived farm income to show that U.S. farmers receive greater government transfers when they face relatively unfavorable market conditions. This transfer countercyclicity is shown to be unrelated to potential deadweight losses constraining government transfers. It is argued that prevailing political economy models have difficulty explaining transfer countercyclicity because they focus on political agents' constraints to the neglect of political agents’ objectives.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)617-629
Number of pages13
JournalAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics
Volume74
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1992
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Countercyclicity
  • Deadweight
  • Government transfers
  • Political economy models

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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