Nozick’s Reply to the Anarchist: What He Said and What He Should have said about Procedural Rights

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Central to Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia is a defense of the legitimacy of the minimal state's use of coercion against anarchist objections. Individuals acting within their natural rights can establish the state without committing wrongdoing against those who disagree. Nozick attempts to show that even with a natural executive right, individuals need not actually consent to incur political obligations. Nozick's argument relies on an account of compensation to remedy the infringement of the non-consenters' procedural rights. Compensation, however, cannot remedy the infringement, for either it is superfluous to Nozick's account of procedural rights, or it is made to play a role inconsistent with Nozick's liberal voluntarist commitments. Nevertheless, Nozick's account of procedural rights contains clues for how to solve the problem. Since procedural rights are incompatible with a natural executive right, Nozickeans can argue that only the state can enforce individuals' rights without wronging anyone, thus refuting the anarchist.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)585-616
Number of pages32
JournalLaw and Philosophy
Volume28
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2009

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remedies
anarchy
utopia
obligation
legitimacy
commitment
Anarchist
Procedural
Robert Nozick
Individual Rights

Keywords

  • procedural justice
  • social contract
  • minimal state
  • reliable procedure
  • state coercion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Law

Cite this

Nozick’s Reply to the Anarchist : What He Said and What He Should have said about Procedural Rights. / Varden, Helga.

In: Law and Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 6, 01.10.2009, p. 585-616.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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