TY - GEN
T1 - Nonoutsourceable scratch-off puzzles to discourage bitcoin mining coalitions
AU - Miller, Andrew
AU - Kosba, Ahmed
AU - Katz, Jonathan
AU - Shi, Elaine
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright 2015 ACM.
PY - 2015/10/12
Y1 - 2015/10/12
N2 - An implicit goal of Bitcoin's reward structure is to diffuse network influence over a diverse, decentralized population of individual participants. Indeed, Bitcoin's security claims rely on no single entity wielding a sufficiently large portion of the network's overall computational power. Unfortunately, rather than participating independently, most Bitcoin miners join coalitions called mining pools in which a central pool administrator largely directs the pool's activity, leading to a consolidation of power. Recently, the largest mining pool has accounted for more than half of network's total mining capacity. Relatedly, "hosted mining" service providers offer their clients the benefit of economies-of-scale, tempting them away from independent participation. We argue that the prevalence of mining coalitions is due to a limitation of the Bitcoin proof-of-work puzzle - specifically, that it affords an effective mechanism for enforcing cooperation in a coalition. We present several definitions and constructions for "nonoutsourceable" puzzles that thwart such enforcement mechanisms, thereby deterring coalitions. We also provide an implementation and benchmark results for our schemes to show they are practical.
AB - An implicit goal of Bitcoin's reward structure is to diffuse network influence over a diverse, decentralized population of individual participants. Indeed, Bitcoin's security claims rely on no single entity wielding a sufficiently large portion of the network's overall computational power. Unfortunately, rather than participating independently, most Bitcoin miners join coalitions called mining pools in which a central pool administrator largely directs the pool's activity, leading to a consolidation of power. Recently, the largest mining pool has accounted for more than half of network's total mining capacity. Relatedly, "hosted mining" service providers offer their clients the benefit of economies-of-scale, tempting them away from independent participation. We argue that the prevalence of mining coalitions is due to a limitation of the Bitcoin proof-of-work puzzle - specifically, that it affords an effective mechanism for enforcing cooperation in a coalition. We present several definitions and constructions for "nonoutsourceable" puzzles that thwart such enforcement mechanisms, thereby deterring coalitions. We also provide an implementation and benchmark results for our schemes to show they are practical.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84954113196&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84954113196&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2810103.2813621
DO - 10.1145/2810103.2813621
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84954113196
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 680
EP - 691
BT - CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015
Y2 - 12 October 2015 through 16 October 2015
ER -