Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

Dan Bernhardt; Mattias K. Polborn

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.024

Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

Dan Bernhardt, Mattias K. Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity-one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	52-54
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	107
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.024
State	Published - Apr 2010

Keywords

Hidden defenses
Randomization
Resource allocation
Security
Terrorism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Online availability

10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.024

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title = "Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists",

abstract = "How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity-one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.",

keywords = "Hidden defenses, Randomization, Resource allocation, Security, Terrorism",

author = "Dan Bernhardt and Polborn, {Mattias K.}",

year = "2010",

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Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Online availability

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