Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

Mark Daniel Bernhardt, Mattias K Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity-one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)52-54
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume107
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2010

Keywords

  • Hidden defenses
  • Randomization
  • Resource allocation
  • Security
  • Terrorism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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