New notions of security: Achieving universal composability without trusted setup

Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion involves comparing the real protocol execution with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)242-251
Number of pages10
JournalConference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
StatePublished - Sep 29 2004
EventProceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing - Chicago, IL, United States
Duration: Jun 13 2004Jun 15 2004

Keywords

  • Environmental Security
  • General Composition
  • Generalized Environmental Security
  • Secure Multi-Party Computation
  • Secure protocols
  • Simulation
  • Universal Composability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

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