Nash equilibrium seeking with finitely- and infinitely-many players

Miroslav Krstic, Paul Frihauf, James Krieger, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


We introduce a non-model based approach for stable attainment of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. Unlike classical game theory, which requires some amount of modeling information, this approach employs deterministic extremum seeking to enable the players to maximize their payoff functions without knowing the underlying model of the game. The players only need to measure their own payoff values. We present results for games for some basic models of economic competition with two players, N players, and infinitely-many players.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication8th IFAC Symposium on Nonlinear Control Systems, NOLCOS 2010
PublisherIFAC Secretariat
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9783902661807
StatePublished - 2010

Publication series

NameIFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)
ISSN (Print)1474-6670


  • Extremum seeking
  • Nash equilibria
  • Noncooperative games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering


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