Abstract
Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents' political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 767-789 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | Nov 9 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 1 2020 |
Keywords
- Philippines
- civil conflict
- election fraud
- institutional weaknesses
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Development
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics