Abstract
Multi-unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi-unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit. In an independent-private-values, pay-your-bid auction where bidders may win up to two units, we show that first-order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability. This behavior is not found in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. It also contrasts with asymmetric first-price auctions of a single good, whose first-order conditions are superficially similar. A uniform-distribution example is analyzed numerically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82, C72.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 25-42 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 1998 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics