TY - JOUR
T1 - Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards
AU - Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
AU - Kahn, Charles M.
PY - 1998/4
Y1 - 1998/4
N2 - Multi-unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi-unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit. In an independent-private-values, pay-your-bid auction where bidders may win up to two units, we show that first-order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability. This behavior is not found in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. It also contrasts with asymmetric first-price auctions of a single good, whose first-order conditions are superficially similar. A uniform-distribution example is analyzed numerically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82, C72.
AB - Multi-unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi-unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit. In an independent-private-values, pay-your-bid auction where bidders may win up to two units, we show that first-order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability. This behavior is not found in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. It also contrasts with asymmetric first-price auctions of a single good, whose first-order conditions are superficially similar. A uniform-distribution example is analyzed numerically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82, C72.
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U2 - 10.1006/game.1997.0599
DO - 10.1006/game.1997.0599
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0002003002
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 23
SP - 25
EP - 42
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -