Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Charles M. Kahn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Multi-unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi-unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit. In an independent-private-values, pay-your-bid auction where bidders may win up to two units, we show that first-order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability. This behavior is not found in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. It also contrasts with asymmetric first-price auctions of a single good, whose first-order conditions are superficially similar. A uniform-distribution example is analyzed numerically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82, C72.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)25-42
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this