Moore's Truths About Causation and Responsibility: A Reply to Alexander and Ferzan

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

In this response to the review of Moore, Causation and Responsibility, by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, previously published in this journal, two issues are discussed. The first is whether causation, counterfactual dependence, moral blame, and culpability, are all scalar properties or relations, that is, matters of more-or-less rather than either-or. The second issue discussed is whether deontological moral obligation is best described as a prohibition against using another as a means, or rather, as a prohibition on an agent strongly causing a prohibited result that was not about to happen anyway while intending to do so.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)445-462
Number of pages18
JournalCriminal Law and Philosophy
Volume6
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2012

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obligation
responsibility
Prohibition
Responsibility
Causation
Culpability
Moral Obligation

Keywords

  • Causation
  • Counterfactual dependence
  • Deontological duty
  • Intention
  • Responsibility
  • Scalarity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Law

Cite this

Moore's Truths About Causation and Responsibility : A Reply to Alexander and Ferzan. / Moore, Michael.

In: Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 01.10.2012, p. 445-462.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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