We analyze how private learning in a class of games with common stochastic payoffs affects the form of equilibria, and how properties such as player welfare and the extent of strategic miscoordination relate across monotone and non-monotone equilibria. Researchers typically focus on monotone equilibria. We provide conditions under which non-monotone equilibria also exist, where players attempt to coordinate to obtain the stochastic payoff whenever signals are in a bounded interval. In bounded interval equilibria (BIE), an endogenous fear of miscoordination discourages players from coordinating to obtain the stochastic payoff when their signals suggest coordination is most beneficial. In contrast to monotone equilibria, expected payoffs from successful coordination in BIE are lower than the ex-ante expected payoff from ignoring signals and always trying to coordinate to obtain the stochastic payoff. We show that BIE only exist when, absent private information, the game would be a coordination game.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty