TY - JOUR
T1 - Model-based evaluation
T2 - From dependability to security
AU - Nicol, David M.
AU - Sanders, William H.
AU - Trivedi, Kishor S.
N1 - The authors would like to thank their past and current research sponsors for supporting this work, and their colleagues and students, both past and present, who also contributed to the research described herein. They would particularly like to thank Mr. Salem Derisavi, Mr. Yun Liu, Dr. Bharat Madan, and Mr. Dazhi Wang in this regard. They would also like to thank Ms. Jenny Applequist for her editorial assistance. Their sponsors include the US National Science Foundation (CCR-0209144, EIA-99-75019, INT-0233490, CCR-0311616, CNS-0406351), AFOSR MURI (F49620-1-0327), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Motorola, and Pioneer Hi-Bred. Their work was also supported under Award No. 2000-DT-CX-K001 from the Office for Domestic Preparedness, US Department of Homeland Security. Points of view in this document are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Department of Homeland Security, or any of the other sponsors. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US National Science Foundation.
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - The development of techniques for quantitative, model-based evaluation of computer system dependability has a long and rich history. A wide array of model-based evaluation techniques is now available, ranging from combinatorial methods, which are useful for quick, rough-cut analyses, to state-based methods, such as Markov reward models, and detailed, discrete-event simulation. The use of quantitative techniques for security evaluation is much less common, and has typically taken the form of formal analysis of small parts of an overall design, or experimental red team-based approaches. Alone, neither of these approaches is fully satisfactory, and we argue that there is much to be gained through the development of a sound model-based methodology for quantifying the security one can expect from a particular design. In this work, we survey existing model-based techniques for evaluating system dependability, and summarize how they are now being extended to evaluate system security. We find that many techniques from dependability evaluation can be applied in the security domain, but that significant challenges remain, largely due to fundamental differences between the accidental nature of the faults commonly assumed in dependability evaluation, and the intentional, human nature of cyber attacks.
AB - The development of techniques for quantitative, model-based evaluation of computer system dependability has a long and rich history. A wide array of model-based evaluation techniques is now available, ranging from combinatorial methods, which are useful for quick, rough-cut analyses, to state-based methods, such as Markov reward models, and detailed, discrete-event simulation. The use of quantitative techniques for security evaluation is much less common, and has typically taken the form of formal analysis of small parts of an overall design, or experimental red team-based approaches. Alone, neither of these approaches is fully satisfactory, and we argue that there is much to be gained through the development of a sound model-based methodology for quantifying the security one can expect from a particular design. In this work, we survey existing model-based techniques for evaluating system dependability, and summarize how they are now being extended to evaluate system security. We find that many techniques from dependability evaluation can be applied in the security domain, but that significant challenges remain, largely due to fundamental differences between the accidental nature of the faults commonly assumed in dependability evaluation, and the intentional, human nature of cyber attacks.
KW - Dependability evaluation
KW - Performability evaluation
KW - Security evaluation
KW - Stochastic modeling
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U2 - 10.1109/TDSC.2004.11
DO - 10.1109/TDSC.2004.11
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:12344275676
SN - 1545-5971
VL - 1
SP - 48
EP - 64
JO - IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
IS - 1
ER -