Mixed Stackelberg Strategies in Continuous-Kernel Games

Tamer Başar, Geert Jan Olsder

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

It is shown that continuous-kernel nonzero-sum games with compact strategy spaces could admit both pure and mixed Stackelberg equilibrium solutions, if the cost function of each player is either non-quadratic or nonconvex in his own decision variable. In such a case, the mixed Stackelberg strategy will yield a lower average cost for the leader than the pure Stackelberg strategy. It is also verified that, if the cost functions of the players are quadratic and strictly convex, then only pure Stackelberg strategies can exist.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)307-309
Number of pages3
JournalIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Volume25
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1980
Externally publishedYes

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Mixed Stackelberg Strategies in Continuous-Kernel Games. / Başar, Tamer; Olsder, Geert Jan.

In: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 25, No. 2, 04.1980, p. 307-309.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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