MINIMUM SENSITIVITY APPROACH TO INCENTIVE DESIGN PROBLEMS.

Derya H. Cansever, M Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The paper introduces the notion of 'robust' incentive schemes in multi-agent decision problems with a hierarchical decision structure, and discusses the derivation of such policies by minimizing, in addition to the usual (standard) Stackelberg performance indices, an appropriate sensitivity function. Such an approach has applications in decision problems wherein the leader does not know the exact values of some parameters characterizing the follower's cost functional, and seeks to robustify his optimum policy in the presence of deviations from the nominal values. An in-depth analysis of such incentive design problems is provided, and optimum robust incentive schemes are derived for general cost functionals with a convex structure. The results are then applied to an incentive design problem arising in economics, leading to some meaningful robust incentive policies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)233-244
Number of pages12
JournalLarge Scale Systems
Volume5
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jan 1 1983
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

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