Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Nolan H. Miller, John W. Pratt, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Scott Johnson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)476-496
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume136
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2007
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Interdependent valuations
  • Mechanism design
  • Multidimensional types

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this