Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Nolan H. Miller; John W. Pratt; Richard J. Zeckhauser; Scott Johnson

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Nolan H. Miller, John W. Pratt, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Scott Johnson

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	476-496
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	136
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005
State	Published - Sep 2007
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Interdependent valuations
Mechanism design
Multidimensional types

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Online availability

10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005

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title = "Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations",

abstract = "We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.",

keywords = "Interdependent valuations, Mechanism design, Multidimensional types",

author = "Miller, {Nolan H.} and Pratt, {John W.} and Zeckhauser, {Richard J.} and Scott Johnson",

note = "Funding Information: We thank Drew Fudenberg, Jerry Green, Daniel Hojman, Deb Hughes-Hallett, Matt Jackson, John H. Lindsey II, Rich McLean, Zvika Neeman, Andy Postlewaite, Phil Reny, Bill Sandholm, Michael Schwarz, Ed Shpiz, various seminar participants, an associate editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Zeckhauser gratefully acknowledges financial support of NSF Grant IIS-0428868.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005",

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AU - Pratt, John W.

AU - Zeckhauser, Richard J.

AU - Johnson, Scott

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KW - Interdependent valuations

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KW - Multidimensional types

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Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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