TY - GEN
T1 - Maya
T2 - 48th ACM/IEEE Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture, ISCA 2021
AU - Pothukuchi, Raghavendra Pradyumna
AU - Pothukuchi, Sweta Yamini
AU - Voulgaris, Petros G.
AU - Schwing, Alexander
AU - Torrellas, Josep
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by NSF grant CNS 1763658. We thank Kevin Colravy for giving us access to and setting up the electrical line tapping apparatus, and Dipanjan Das for providing the instrumentation software for this experiment. We are grateful to Prof. Tarek Abdelzaher for providing access to his cloud computing testbed.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.
PY - 2021/6
Y1 - 2021/6
N2 - The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through their power consumption. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data from this side channel.To address this problem, this paper presents Maya, a simple and effective defense against power side channels. The idea is to use formal control to re-shape the power dissipated by a computer in an application-transparent manner - preventing attackers from learning any information about the applications that are running. With formal control, a controller can reliably keep power close to a desired target function even when runtime conditions change unpredictably. By selecting the target function intelligently, the controller can make power to follow any desired shape, appearing to carry activity information which, in reality, is unrelated to the application. Maya can be implemented in privileged software, firmware, or simple hardware. In this paper, we implement Maya on three machines using privileged threads only, and show its effectiveness and ease of deployment. Maya has already thwarted a newly-developed remote power attack.
AB - The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through their power consumption. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data from this side channel.To address this problem, this paper presents Maya, a simple and effective defense against power side channels. The idea is to use formal control to re-shape the power dissipated by a computer in an application-transparent manner - preventing attackers from learning any information about the applications that are running. With formal control, a controller can reliably keep power close to a desired target function even when runtime conditions change unpredictably. By selecting the target function intelligently, the controller can make power to follow any desired shape, appearing to carry activity information which, in reality, is unrelated to the application. Maya can be implemented in privileged software, firmware, or simple hardware. In this paper, we implement Maya on three machines using privileged threads only, and show its effectiveness and ease of deployment. Maya has already thwarted a newly-developed remote power attack.
KW - Control theory
KW - Machine learning
KW - Obfuscation
KW - Physical side channels
KW - Power side channels
KW - Security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85114693873&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85114693873&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00074
DO - 10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00074
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85114693873
T3 - Proceedings - International Symposium on Computer Architecture
SP - 888
EP - 901
BT - Proceedings - 2021 ACM/IEEE 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture, ISCA 2021
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 14 June 2021 through 19 June 2021
ER -