Managerial control benefits and takeover market efficiency

Wenyu Wang, Yufeng Wu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

How and to what extent do managerial control benefits shape the efficiency of the takeover market? We revisit this question by estimating both the dark and bright sides of managerial control benefits in an industry equilibrium model. On the dark side, managers’ private benefits of control distort firms’ takeover incentives and hinder the reallocation role of the takeover market. On the bright side, fear of a takeover induces underperforming managers to exert more effort and enhances the disciplinary role of the takeover market. Our estimates suggest that the bright-side effect increases the value created by an active takeover market by 21%, comparable in magnitude to the dark-side effect. It is also important to account for this bright-side effect in explaining certain features of the takeover market, including a low takeover-performance sensitivity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)857-878
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume136
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2020

Keywords

  • Mergers and acquisitions
  • Private benefits of control
  • Structural estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

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